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Abstract 
This article examines the intersection of religious faith and the ‘fight against modern slavery’ 
in the UK, as yet unexplored in sociological literature. Analysis of faith based organisations’ 
(FBOs) activities in this area challenges understandings of a postsecular rapprochement 
between faith and secular actors -  where postsecular is used by some scholars to refer to the 
re-emergence of faith in the public sphere, and where we understand rapprochement to mean 
the placing of equal value on faith-based and secular worldviews. Our research reveals that 
FBOs in the anti-trafficking/modern slavery third sector operate on a ‘dual register’, 
secularising as they professionalise their public face, while retaining religious distinctiveness 
when engaging with co-religionists. We argue that, rather than evidence of  a genuine two way 
postsecular rapprochement, it seems that FBOs in this sector are prioritising secular modalities, 
meaning the learning process is one-sided rather than complementary.  
 








On the 2nd December  2014, representatives of major global faith traditions convened at the 
Vatican to sign the Joint Declaration of Religious Leaders Against Modern Slavery, which 
pledged to eradicate modern slavery and human trafficking by 2020 (Global Freedom Network, 
2016: 4).i This event was organised by the Global Freedom Network, which had been set up 
earlier in 2014 by Australian Christian philanthropist and mining magnate Andrew Forrest, on 
the premise that  ‘religious faith can be a powerful motivating force inspiring individual and 
community action both spiritually and practically’.ii  While global multi-faith initiatives for 
social action are not unprecedented, the emergence of a global faith alliance on modern slavery 
and human trafficking is a newer phenomenon and resonates with faith-inspired abolitionist 
movements to eradicate transatlantic slavery in the 18th and 19th centuries. Academic studies 
of the U.S. context note the influence of evangelical Christians, in particular, on government 
anti-trafficking policy, especially during the George W. Bush administration (2001-2008). 
Scholars argue that this influence emerges in the adoption of human trafficking approaches 
which conflate sex work and sexual exploitation (Weitzer, 2007; Zimmerman, 2011) and focus 
on individual bad actors in place of a recognition of wider structural causes of exploitation 
(Zimmerman, 2011). While the Obama administration (2009-2016) expanded the definition of 
human trafficking to encompass other forms of exploitation (Chuang, 2014), the conflating of 
sex work and sexual exploitation remains prominent in both U.S. domestic and international 
anti-trafficking activities (Milivojevic and Pickering, 2013). 
 
However, the role of faith-based organisations (FBOs) in responses to human trafficking, 
forced labour and modern slavery in the UK has received little sociological attention compared 
to faith engagement with other social issues (but see Pemberton, 2006, who promotes the 
possibilities for churches to mobilise social action around 'sex trafficking'). Is this faith-based 
response to modern slavery and human trafficking distinctive? Or do the activities of these faith 
actors differ little from other professionals working in this area? If the latter, is there any 
discernible impact from the injection of faith on the practical and discursive construction of 
this field? This article  considers these questions within wider sociological debates around the 
‘re-emergence of faith’ in the public sphere, and suggestions that we are living in a ‘postsecular 
era’, or that the increased numbers of faith-secular partnerships indicate a ‘postsecular 
rapprochement’ in the public sphere, where a rapprochement refers to ‘an agreement reached 





2006; McLennan, 2007). Following Tomalin (2018), we contend that the concept of the 
postsecular fails to adequately consider the extent to which many faith actors operate on a ‘dual 
register’: secularising as they professionalise in their public facing work, while retaining 
religious distinctiveness when engaging with co-religionists. This is particularly the case for 
those faith actors who operate as formal third-sector organisations and often receive 
government funding, such as those we mainly focus on in this article. Are we seeing a genuine 
‘postsecular rapprochement’ between these actors and their secular counterparts, if these faith 
actors are adapting themselves to secular environments and moderating, downplaying or hiding 
their distinctive faith identity as they ‘professionalise’(Cloke and Beaumont, 2013)? While this 
latter observation is not new (see for instance Cairns et al., 2007; Dinham, 2009; Harris et al., 
2003; Prochaska, 2006), others have not examined the implications of this for postsecular 
theory, which is the key sociological contribution of our paper to these debates.  
 
It is important to briefly define our key terms. Modern slavery, although not defined in any 
international legal instrument, is generally understood as an umbrella term encompassing 
human trafficking, slavery, servitude and forced labour (Patterson and Zhuo, 2018). Human 
trafficking – understood to involve recruitment, transportation, harbouring or receipt of persons 
– is not synonymous with modern slavery; severe exploitation may occur without a process of 
‘trafficking’. Relatedly, the tendency to equate human trafficking primarily with sex work is 
challenged by statisticsiv that suggest the majority of those now considered to be in ‘modern 
slavery’ are in forced labour in sectors such as agriculture, construction, hospitality and 
manufacturing, as well as domestic exploitation and coerced criminal activity. McGrath and 
Watson (2018) call this cluster of terms trafficking, forced labour and slavery (TFLS). For 
brevity, this article uses ‘anti-TFLS’ to refer to the growing field of responses to ‘modern 
slavery’ conceived of as a broader phenomenon than human trafficking.  
 
This paper refers to both faith and religion, while acknowledging that they can have different 
meanings. Although they are used interchangeably, the language of ‘faith’ dominates policy 
discourses, so we mostly use the term ‘faith’ here. We suggest that one reason that ‘religion’ 
is avoided in policy discourses is because it points to differences that lead to social division, 
whereas having a ‘faith’ is something that is shared by people regardless of their religious 
tradition. We use the term ‘faith actor’ to refer to individuals, institutions and organisations 
that have a faith background, and the term faith-based organisation (FBO), as a subset of ‘faith 





ethos (see Sider and Unruh, 2004).  By ‘professionalised’, we mean taking on market-like 
features such as effective/ efficient service delivery and demonstrating improved ability to 
access statutory funding and highly skilled human capital. As we note below, the literature on 
FBOs, which mainly focusses on North America, generally treats professionalisation as 
involving secularisation (Bielefeld and Cleveland, 2013). This, in itself, challenges theories of 
the postsecular and the existence of a genuine postsecular rapprochement within the faith-based 
anti-TFLS third sector. 
 
We begin by outlining rebuttals to the secularisation thesis, (i.e. that modernisation would 
inevitably lead to the decline in religious belief and practice), on the basis that religious faith 
has a renewed role in public life in the UK.  Since the 1980s, a willingness to engage faith 
actors in the provision of social welfare has coincided with neoliberal welfare reforms. We then 
present the findings of our mapping of UK anti-TFLS organisations. Finally, we discuss the 
implications of this for the questions of how the faith based organisations working in this field 
negotiate between maintaining a distinctive faith identity and a professional public face, and 
what an examination of anti-TFLS faith engagement contributes to sociological theories of the 
postsecular. 
  
Theorizing the ‘postsecular’ society 
 
In the UK, as elsewhere, assumptions that religious faith in modern societies was to become 
only relevant in the private lives of individuals, most likely eventually disappearing altogether, 
have been challenged by the continued presence of faith actors in the public sphere. This 
persistent or even resurgent presence of faith exists in tension with global concerns about a 
clash between the values of secularism (the ideology that secularisation should be promoted) 
and religious particularisms, most strongly focussed on the effects of so-called Islamic 
fundamentalism (Asad, 1993). While late 19th to early 20th Century sociologists such as Weber 
(1930) and Durkheim (1915) focussed on the demise of religion as a public social force, today 
the secularisation thesis is recognised as flawed. Drawing on Eder (2002; 2006), Cloke and 
Beaumont (2013: 35) contend that we can observe a trend of religious faith re-emerging into 
the public sphere and rediscovering ‘its voice’. While we share Cloke and Beaumont’s view 
that we need to distance ourselves from any idea of an ‘epochal shift from a secular age….to a 
postsecular age’ (2013: 29), others go further in claiming that we are witnessing the emergence 






Habermas is the most famous discussant of the postsecular and proponent of postsecular theory, 
and takes both a descriptive and normative approach. He states that modern societies are 
becoming increasingly postsecular and that faith actors and secular actors should participate 
in a ‘complementary learning process’, where ‘both sides can…then take seriously each 
other’s contributions to controversial themes in the public sphere’ (Habermas, 2006: 258). 
While Habermas’ idea of a ‘complementary learning process’ might seem to respect all forms 
of knowledge and allow individuals to share their perspectives in their own voices, he has been 
widely criticised for ultimately holding a secularist position when he writes that ‘in a 
constitutional state, all norms that can be legally implemented must be formulated and publicly 
justified in a language that all the citizens understand’ (2008: 28; see also Dillon, 2012; 
Tomalin, 2018). For Habermas, this ‘publicly justified language’ corresponds to reasoned 
secular discourse that prohibits reference, for instance, to divine authority or revelation, and 
necessitates that ‘religious citizens’ ultimately have to translate ‘their religious norms into a 
secular idiom’ (Dillon, 2012: 258). We argue that if we are witnessing faith actors adapting 
their communications and activities to appear non-religious in order to be acceptable to a wider 




Building on the work of sociologist of religion José Casanova, who argues that 
secularisation is multidimensional, we also argue that there is a need to be more specific 
about what aspect of postsecularisation we are referring to (1994). Casanova (1994) posits 
three types of secularising process: differentiation (i.e. the separation of realms of modern 
life into distinct subsystems with their own function and rationality, which means the 
separation of religious communication from secular modes); privatisation (i.e. where 
religion becomes less significant in the public sphere); and the decline of individual 
religious belief and affiliation. This is also a useful way to think about postsecularisation. 
Our discussion here does not require comment on the extent to which individual religious 
belief and affiliation is in decline, although there is evidence that in global north settings 
such as the UK, this is the case (Davie, 2015).  We are more interested in the other two 
senses of secularisation and whether they have been reversed. While there is evidence that 
desecularisation, or ‘postsecularisation’, is taking place in the sense of the deprivatisation 





the need for the faith actors that were part of our research to secularise their communication 
strategies in the public sphere, means that we cannot define the rapprochement between 
these faith actors and their secular counterparts as postsecular. We argue that the labelling 
of concepts and processes matters if we are to precisely capture the nature of faith-secular 
partnerships. Characterising the rapprochement we observed as postsecular overlooks the 
important observation that many faith actors are ‘strategically shift[ing]’ between secular 
and religious ‘modes of communication’ (Tomalin, 2018: 3) as the discussion of our research 
below demonstrates.   
 
Faith and welfare pluralism in the UK 
 
In the UK, the last few decades have seen the increased visibility of both faith and faith actors 
in the public sphere, facilitated by, and running parallel to, the advent of neoliberal welfare 
state restructuring in the 1980s. While the establishment of the modern welfare state in 1945 
may be widely thought of as secular, it was endorsed by key faith actors like Archbishop 
William Temple, who argued that the ‘State is under the moral law of God, and is intended by 
Him to be an instrument for human welfare’ (Jawad, 2012: 45). Such an explicit Christian 
articulation all but disappeared in the UK in the following decades, although faith actors had 
played the role of a welfare state before 1945 (Jawad, 2012). However, welfare state 
retrenchment has created space for faith actors to take a bigger role in the provision of public 
services as government services have been outsourced (Evans et al., 2005; Williams et al., 
2012). Simultaneously, secular and faith-based charities and community groups have stepped 
in to alleviate the social consequences of the shrinking welfare state (Beaumont, 2008; 
Beaumont and Cloke, 2012; Cloke et al., 2010; Fyfe, 2005). For some faith actors, this public 
role has gone beyond merely serving the poor, to advocating for changes in policy (Beaumont, 
2008; Wills et al., 2009).  
 
The growing public service role of faith actors from the 1980s onwards was further facilitated 
by important shifts in how British Christians, especially evangelical Christians, understood 
their roles in society (Cloke et al., 2012; Filby, 2011). At this time evangelical Christians who 
had often, but not always - see note later on The Salvation Army - historically rejected social 





2012). Evangelical Christians like Steve Chalke, founder of Stop The Traffik (a prominent anti-
TFLS campaigning organisation), came increasingly to understand praxis as an important 
element of their faith. Minority faiths have also played an important role in addressing the 
consequences of welfare state retrenchment. The Al-Manaar Mosque and Muslim volunteers 
were central in offering support to survivors of the Grenfell tower disaster (Kellaway, 2018), 
for example, while, Sikh Gurdwaras regularly provide shelter and food for homeless or needy 
people (Singh, 2015). 
 
There are unresolved debates about whether faith actors’ greater role in service provision is 
positive or negative, and whether there is anything ‘distinctive’ about what they do. The faith 
motive of FBOs may be understood as offering understandings of social justice that challenge 
the policies that cause poverty, rather than merely ameliorating their symptoms (Wills et al., 
2009). However, third sector organisations’ involvement in welfare state services can also be 
seen as part of ‘roll-out neoliberalism’ (Peck and Tickell, 2002: 384), disciplining service users 
on behalf of the state (Lancione, 2014), and mitigating the worst effects of welfare state 
retrenchment, thereby relieving the government of its responsibilities. There are also concerns 
that outsourcing welfare state services to FBOs has increased the influence of conservative 
faith leaders, at the expense of women and sexual minorities (Patel, 2011).  
 
Researching anti-TFLS in the UK 
 
There is a significant body of scholarship exploring the growing role of faith actors in many 
different areas of welfare service provision, including homelessness (Johnsen, 2014), drug 
rehabilitation (Williams, 2015), food banks (Cloke et al., 2017), as well as humanitarianism 
and international development (Roth, 2019; Tomalin, 2015). There are studies of the role of 
faith actors in anti-TFLS in both the USA (Campbell and Zimmerman, 2014; Zimmerman, 
2010; 2011; 2013) and the global south (Frame, 2017; Raimi, 2012), but very little research on 
this topic in the UK. This paper draws on a wider ESRCv funded project that aims to investigate 
the roles of FBOs in anti-TFLS in the UK. It does not include a focus on the informal role of 
local faith communities and their places of worship in anti-TFLS. The project as a whole 
included 86 in-depth qualitative interviews, analysis of the contribution of FBOs and other faith 
actors to committees and inquiries relating to the Modern Slavery Act in Hansard, a mapping 
of the anti-TFLS third sector and analysis of visual communications in the field. The core 





identified as ‘victims of modern slavery’ (30 interviews with managers and staff); and 
interviews with 21 civil society and government key informants, 14 people who had received 
support and 20 civil society representatives in the Netherlands and Spain. This article discusses 
the first phase of research which reviewed literature produced by FBOs and mapped the 
publicly available communications of anti-TFLS third sector organisations to examine FBO 
roles in service provision and campaigning. We highlight below examples from documents 
identified in our mapping, library and database that include explicit references to a Christian 
perspective; whereas much material produced by ‘FBOs’ does not adopt a specifically religious 
standpoint and reproduces generic or hegemonic (secular) readings of TFLS. 
 
The mapping examined the publicly available communications of third sector organisations 
involved in anti-TFLS in the UK between May and August 2017. We identified organisations 
through: our existing knowledge; the list of NRM subcontractors;vi and the ‘first responder 
agencies’ to whom a suspected victim of modern slavery must initially be referred.vii Adding 
an exploration of the Charity Commission listings under ‘trafficking’ and ‘slavery’ helped to 
pick up some constituted organisations less networked or cross referenced in others’ reports or 
without a clear web or social media presence. A snowball technique identified further 
organisations via collaborators listed in websites and reports (e.g. Bradstock et al., 2014), and 
social media, especially Twitter profiles and ‘followers’. Third sector organisations addressing 
TFLS in the UK were included due to the focus of the research on anti-TFLS activities in the 
UK. Organisations with offices in the UK, but whose anti-modern slavery interventions are in 
the Global South (such as Islamic Relief) were excluded, as were statutory bodies such as 
Regional Strategic Migration Partnerships, the Gangmasters and Labour Abuse Authority 
(GLAA), and the police Modern Slavery and Human Trafficking Unit (MSHTU). Although 
there is informal support of vulnerable migrants in places of worship of all faiths in the UK, 
the congregational level was beyond the scope of this research. The mapping offers a snapshot 
of a particular time period in 2017 in a rapidly changing sector where new initiatives are 
frequently emerging and existing organisations expanding into the anti-TFLS field. 
 
The organisations were classified according to several criteria, including: links to a faith 
tradition or self-identification as faith-based; relationship with the state (e.g. involvement in 
NRM provision); whether a single-issue anti-TFLS organisation or one with a wider remit; and 
type of activities. Organisations were categorised according to their stated priorities and main 





people who were not trafficked (e.g. providing training on TFLS to professionals), or some 
combination of the three. For example, while the Human Trafficking Foundation provides 
emergency bursaries to trafficked persons, their main focus is on lobbying parliament and 
raising public awareness and they were categorised as 'mainly campaigning'. 
 
Drawing on Sider and Unruh (2004), we determined whether an organisation was faith-based 
by examining the presence of: explicit or implicit religious references in the mission statement 
and other NGO-written texts; any links to a specific church or other faith institution; whether 
or not published profiles of trustees and staff stated their faith or membership of a faith body; 
and requirement for faith affiliation in any job advertisements. While there were areas of 
ambivalence that sometimes made classification difficult, this speaks to the extent to which 
FBOs feel willing or able to identify their religious identity, a topic explored below in 
discussion of the mapping. The mapping exercise identified only one non-Christian (Jewish) 
organisation, so we focus on Christianity in this article.  
 
Is there a distinctive ‘faith-based approach’ response to modern slavery? 
 
Christian FBOs are significant in the provision of services under the National Referral 
Mechanism (NRM). Introduced in 2009, the NRM was established to meet the UK’s 
obligations under the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human 
Beings.viii A person who is considered by the UK Visas and Immigration (UKVI) or the 
National Crime Agency’s Modern Slavery Human Trafficking Unit (MSHTU) to have 
‘reasonable grounds’ to be considered a victim of modern slavery is entitled to a 45 day period 
to ‘reflect and recover’ (National Crime Agency, n. d.). The NRM offers accommodation, 
psychological support, health care and legal and immigration advice. In 2011, NRM service 
provision was outsourced to The Salvation Army (TSA), an evangelical Christian church as 
well as an FBO and the largest non-government provider of social care, that ‘exists to save 
souls, grow saints and serve suffering humanity’ (The Salvation Army, 2018). TSA further 
sub-contracted services to 12 organisations, eight secular, and four FBOs. Two of the FBOs 
and one of the secular groups are solely or primarily anti-trafficking organisations; the rest are 
women’s charities, social housing and support providers, and a migrant support charity. On 29 






Discussion of the controversial decision to award the contract to TSA sheds light on the context 
in which FBOs are operating in the anti-TFLS third sector, and raises questions around the 
existence of a postsecular rapprochement in the sector.  In particular, it suggests that faith actors 
may be viewed with suspicion by their secular counterparts. Before 2011, the NRM contract 
was held by The Poppy Project, a project of Eaves Housing, a charity established in 2003 to 
support women with experience of domestic and sexual violence, as well as Migrant Helpline, 
another secular charity (ATMG, 2010). Concerns were raised about the loss of considerable 
experience in not re-contracting the Poppy Project. Immigration solicitor Catherine Robinson 
said that it was ‘deeply disappointing that the Poppy Project's proven expertise in working with 
trafficked women has not been given proper recognition or weight’ and that retaining ‘a gender-
specific and specialist service with a proven track record’ was an absolute necessity in this field 
(Hodgson and Robinson, 2011). Globally, TSA are early adopters in the field, having been 
prominent in early antecedents of contemporary anti-trafficking advocacy in the early to mid 
20th century (Limoncelli, 2017). The Poppy Project suggested that it had lost the contract 
because of its critiques of government policy, and that TSA were seen as more biddable (Hill, 
2011). The government responded that TSA had put in a stronger bid, and that its plan to 
subcontract would allow them to provide services across England and Wales (Butler and 
Travis, 2011). Other critiques focussed even more strongly on the faith identity of TSA. The 
Rt Hon Dr Denis MacShane MP wrote a letter to the Ministry of Justice Minister Crispin Blunt 
(who awarded the contract):  
The idea that the vulnerable, scared women from Muslim, Orthodox, Buddhist and other 
cultural backgrounds who face violence and torture from their pimps and traffickers here 
in Britain should now be handed over to a proselytising mono-religious organisation like 
the Salvation Army beggars belief (Womensgrid, 2011). 
This comment expresses fears that faith actors, especially those with a mission to evangelise, 
are distinctive in not always approaching service provision for a diverse client base 
appropriately. 
 
Despite little academic research on the roles of faith-based anti-TFLS activity, Christian actors 
and authors have written books, briefing papers, and reports about their activities. These 
documents provide insights into how Christians understand and approach modern slavery, and 
the theological underpinnings of their interventions. Common to these reports is an expression 
of TFLS as a violation of ‘human dignity’, as well as human rights, and that Christians are not 





advantage. Christian Action in Research and Education (CARE) (2017: 2) state ‘CARE 
believes that every person is made in the image of God and that human trafficking is a violation 
of that fundamental truth’. A Church of Scotland document Human Trafficking: To Be Silent 
is to be Unfaithful claims ‘to be silent …is not an option; we are called to care for all God’s 
creation. We are called to love our neighbour’(Church of Scotland, 2007). Emphasising 
distinctiveness, Ben Cooley (2015: 71), the founder of anti-TFLS organisation Hope for 
Justice, writes:  
I’ve learnt that one man plus the power of God equals victory every time no matter 
what the odds. This means that when the Church gets involved in the darkest places, 
we can transform them.  
The (Catholic) Religious in Europe Networking Against Trafficking and Exploitation 
(RENATE) (2015: 8) report A Mapping Across Europe explicitly states:  
The uniqueness of RENATE – as contrasted with secular agencies - is that its 
prophetic action is sustained and inspired by deep Christian faith. Faith in holding 
on to the God who liberates from injustice and oppression.  
An interesting counterpoint to these reports is Pemberton Ford (2017), who discusses what 
Pentecostal churches can do to better address human trafficking and domestic violence in their 
congregations, but does not examine the theological underpinnings. 
 
Somewhat more diversity can be seen in how trafficking is understood, and victimhood 
constructed, in these documents. Collectively, the Christian literature suggests a 
disproportionate, but not exclusive, focus on the sexual exploitation of women and children. 
The Church of Scotland (2007) report cites only examples of women and children in sexual 
exploitation. CARE’s first priority for combatting human trafficking is criminalising the 
purchase of sex. However, CARE (2017: 1) also state: ‘people are trafficked into prostitution, 
agricultural and building labour, manufacturing, domestic servitude, forced begging, benefit 
fraud and petty criminality, and organ removal’ and Fighting Slavery – Faith in Action 
(Kinsella and Stanley, 2015) includes a wide range of exploitative situations, including brick 
kilns and cannabis farms in India.  
 
We can thus identify a sense among these Christian actors that human trafficking is a grave 
social ill that Christians are particularly called to combat. The historic Christian involvement 
in the anti-slavery movement, and the conflation of human-trafficking and sex work is likely 





Stanley, a Christian and former strategy director at Stop the Traffik, describes himself as a 
‘modern day William Wilberforce’ (Stanley, 2015: 84). What does this mean, practically, for 
Christians involved in campaigning and in service provision? Has there been a distinctive 
Christian contribution in these areas or evidence of a postsecular rapprochement between a 
Christian and secular approach? 
 
Mapping  the anti-TFLS third sector 
 
We undertook a mapping of the anti-TFLS third sector to answer these questions and to better 
understand the roles played by FBOs. This identified 115 third sector organisations involved 
in providing services and/ or engaging in campaigning on TFLS in the UK. Of these, we 
analysed 34 (30%) as faith-based, and 81 (70%) as secular. All of the FBOs except one (René 
Cassin, Jewish) are Christian. At first sight, FBOs therefore do not appear as prominently in 
anti-TFLS as in other sectors where FBO welfare provision dominates, such as homelessness 
(Johnsen, 2014). However, delving into organisational focus and activities raises interesting 
questions about the roles of FBOs in anti-TFLS. 46 of the 115 organisations focus only on 
addressing modern slavery as a single issue rather than as part of a wider remit of services to a 
range of groups. Of these single issue groups, 45% (21) are FBOs. FBOs are thus more strongly 
represented among single-issue anti-TFLS groups than in anti-TFLS overall. Moreover, of the 
28 single-issue groups that provide services to trafficked persons, either as a main focus or in 
conjunction with other activities, FBOs make up 57% (16). The corollary to this is that faith-
based anti-TFLS organisations are not playing as large a role in campaigning as they do in 
service provision (4, or 24% of 17 single-issue groups active in campaigning without service 
provision are FBOs).  
 
FBO involvement in service provision to so-called ‘potential victims of modern slavery’ should 
not be surprising given how growing service provision by FBOs, through government contracts 
and to ‘fill the gaps’ left by a retrenching welfare state, has been highlighted in studies of 
welfare pluralism and the postsecular. A potentially significant detail is that many of the multi-
issue organisations mapped pre-date the upsurge in interest in modern slavery over the last 
decade. In contrast, Christian individuals and institutions seem more likely to have decided to 
establish a dedicated, faith-based response in recent years, through setting up specialist, single-
issue organisations. We also found that, of eight non-NRM accommodation projects (operating 





and three of these (2 FBOs, 1 secular) are only for women exiting the sex industry. This focus 
on women could indicate that beyond government contracts, understandings of TFLS have not 
yet moved on to reflect broader definitions of modern slavery. It is nevertheless difficult to 
untangle whether an increase in faith-based organisations responding to TFLS was generated 
by the ratification of the 2009 Council of Europe Convention, and then the Modern Slavery 
Act 2015, or if the increase denotes a distinctively motivated faith-based response indicated in 
an apparent emphasis on service provision over campaigning or advocacy. 
 
The mapping analysis was hampered by the difficulty of establishing whether a particular 
organisation had a faith identity. Some FBOs downplay their religious origins and connections. 
This is true for those involved in service provision and for those involved in campaigning. 
Hope for Justice is a Christian charity whose main focus is service provision to trafficked 
persons; the only mention of their faith identity on their website is far down in their FAQ page. 
Similarly, A21 is known in the anti-TFLS sector as an evangelical Christian organisation, but 
there is no reference to this on their website. Also, not all organisations founded by individuals 
of faith are to be viewed as FBOs. Stop the Traffik, founded by prominent evangelical Christian 
Steve Chalke does not self-define as an FBO. Publicly available information was thoroughly 
examined to establish as clear a picture as possible and with the awareness that religious 
affiliation is not always obvious at first sight.  Bournemouth Churches Housing Association 
(BCHA) for example, has a name that would suggest a religious affiliation, but a careful 
analysis of the information on its website, and its trustee board, revealed that this was a 
historical relic and that the organisation is now secular. Given the obscurity of some 
organisations’ faith-secular positioning in public communications, we used the ‘Wayback 
Machine’x web archiving tool, which archives websites at particular dates, to delve into the 
faith orientations of some organisations. We observed the faith origins of some NRM 
subcontracted FBOs becoming increasingly hidden. For example, in 2011 the City Hearts 
website reflected the growth of a project under the wing of an evangelical church, their 
webpages nestled within the website of Hope City Church. Now the organisation has its own, 
more secularised, website with references to inspiring Bible quotes, or faith terms such as 
‘love,’ largely removed. A senior manager of a FBO, associated with evangelical Christianity, 
whom we interviewed, described how their public communications had transformed over the 
nine years the organisation had been established, saying: ‘we were far more Christian in our 
language right at the beginning’. They further emphasised that ‘what I've done as a faith-based 





looked down on, particularly in the Christian faith’. This confirms a strategic, deliberate shift 
towards data on ‘outputs’ taking prominence in public communications with a sensitivity to 
possible negative perceptions of faith or Christian-based organisational identity. 
FBOs and ‘professionalism’ in the anti-TFLS third sector 
 
This sensitivity around possible negative perceptions points to the importance, when theorising 
the postsecular, of considering how FBOs operate within a particular arena. The de-emphasis 
of faith identity occurring on the websites of some FBOs provides an interesting contrast to the 
literature produced by anti-TFLS faith actors reviewed earlier, that posits a particular role for 
Christians. This perhaps reflects how Christian-based literature is aimed to communicate 
primarily with co-religionists; the CARE briefing was written for the (presumably evangelical 
Christian) supporters of the organisation, for example. By contrast, how an organisation 
presents itself on its website reflects how it wishes to be perceived by the wider society. As a 
member of frontline staff in an FBO offering services to people exiting severe exploitation 
described: ‘We wouldn’t have a gay story in the magazine, would we? We wouldn’t have a 
transgender story…[or] a story about abortion…a woman who has been raped and stuff. You 
always sort of… play your audiences, say [if] it was a group of nuns. But if it was a group of 
students, I could give quite a different talk’. This suggests that many anti-TFLS FBOs are 
operating on what Tomalin (2018: 3) refers to as a dual register, ‘strategically shift[ing]’ 
between secular and religious ‘modes of communication.’  
 
This public de-emphasis of faith can be understood in the context of the tendency among some 
FBOs to distance themselves from their faith identity as they expand and professionalise, in 
response to changing demographics of staff and volunteers, as well as funding pressures and 
government regulations (Bielefeld and Cleveland, 2013). If an organisation wishes to maintain 
a distinctive faith identity through only hiring co-religionists, for example, that will limit the 
pool of qualified staff and may undermine professionalism. In addition, the concerns raised 
when TSA was awarded the NRM contract, especially those around proselytisation, indicate 
how a public unease with overtly religious service provision, justified or not, forms part of the 
context in which anti-TFLS FBOs are operating.  
 
The professionalization of faith actors in the anti-TFLS sector can be driven by two motives, 





public expression, and therefore for our conceptualisation of ‘postsecular rapprochement.’  
Some faith actors are motivated to de-emphasise their faith out of an instrumental need to 
appear more ‘professional’ in order to gain funding or establish credibility in policy-
influencing with secular partners. Further, this may be accompanied by a second motive, a 
‘professional’ desire to downplay the particularism of Christian motivation and ambition to 
avoid any sense of preference or favouritism towards potential service users according to their 
faith identity, motivated by a desire to ensure equality of access to people of all faiths or none. 
In this sense, some FBOs (those that are more ‘professionalised’) are more likely to have 
commonalities with professionalised secular organisations than they would with other, more 
distinctive, FBOs. While professionalism is not incompatible with some degree of faith 
identity, there does appear to be a trade-off between distinctiveness and professionalism among 
FBOs. 
 
We argue that this de-emphasis of a distinctive faith identity by some FBOs complicates 
understandings of what constitutes a genuine postsecular rapprochement. If, as discussed 
above, we view genuine postsecular rapprochement as involving a ‘complementary learning 
process in which the secular and the religious sides involve one another’ (Habermas, 2010: 21, 
cited in Cloke and Beaumont, 2013: 37), then is not clear that such a process is occurring 
between FBOs and secular organisations involved in anti-TFLS. Instead, it would appear as if 
many FBOs have made a conscious choice to secularise their image and adopt statutory 
language when discussing TFLS. The dual register made apparent in the more overt faith 
perspective adopted in FBO reports, suggests FBOs are instrumentally emphasising their faith 
ties when beneficial, and downplaying them in secular facing communications. This allows 
them to garner trust and respect in a secular society, while also mobilising support and 
resources from co-religionists.  In light of this, the mere existence of faith and secular 
organisations working together in partnership is evidence of a rapprochement but not of a two-
way postsecular rapprochement, as in these interactions, many FBOs are simply acting as 
secular organisations for the purposes of the partnerships.  This, in turn, points to the need for 
nuance and specificity in sociological theorizing of the ‘postsecular’; the mere presence of faith 
actors in a particular public arena should not necessarily be taken as evidence of a postsecular 
rapprochement. 
 
Our discussion here focusses on whether or not a two-way postsecular rapprochement is 





anti-TFLS, rather than upon how FBOs employ the faith end of their ‘dual register’ in their 
day-to-day activities, beyond the glare of the secularising public sphere. This could be in 
terms of their interactions with co-religionists but also with non-religious clients, 
employees and volunteers. An emphasis upon the faith-secular rapprochement within 
organisations and movements is, however, the focus of the case studies presented by Cloke 
et al. (2019) where they explore how religious and secular views and subjectivities within 
organisations and social movements can engage with, and learn from, each other (Cloke and 
Beaumont, 2013; Williams, 2015). Drawing on Habermas, they observe the emergence of what 
they call ‘crossover narratives’ that ‘emerge from the engagement of mutual tolerance across 
religious/secular boundaries’ (2019: 21). They argue that ‘mutual translation, then, leads 
to complementary learning’ characteristic of postsecularity (2019:21). Cloke (2011: 478) 
contends, for instance, that elements of theological understandings of evil (where evil is seen 
as an independent spiritual force in opposition to God) and secular understandings (that focus 
on ‘philosophical and empirical accounts of violence and suffering’) have combined in 
crossover narratives and shared action on social issues like homelessness. Given the wider 
context in which FBOs are expected to present a secular face in order to be seen as 
‘professional’, it is perhaps not surprising that despite similarities in approach, it was unclear 
from our research the extent to which faith narratives and moral frameworks might have 
crossed over into broader discourses that characterise the anti-TFLS domain. Following Cloke 
et al. (2019) we do surmise that crossover narratives might be evident where we find faith and 
secular actors working towards a shared ethical agenda (i.e. neo-abolitionism). To determine 
this, however, research would need to be carried out across the broad anti-TFLS terrain to 
examine the genealogy of shared narratives, emerging from faith based or secular discourses. 
 
Conclusions 
An era of welfare pluralism in the UK sees third sector organisations increasingly acting as 
providers of welfare services as the state incorporates them within ‘roll-out neoliberalism’ 
(Peck and Tickell, 2002: 384). FBOs have emerged as significant players in this terrain of 
welfare provision. We have established, through the first mapping exercise of this type in the 
UK, that FBOs are now a significant part of the anti-TFLS sector; especially in the provision 
of services to trafficked persons, and that more single issue organisations that offer services 





and that faith-based action is more likely to be specialised; ‘hiving off’ anti-TFLS as a focused 
concern, not one necessarily embedded in broader anti-poverty or rights-based social action. 
 
Although we have shown that FBOs and individual faith actors play visible roles in anti-TFLS 
service provision and campaigning, we question whether this is really evidence of a postsecular 
rapprochement. Clearly, FBOs in service provision and campaigning are heterogeneous; and 
many are eschewing or moderating a distinctive faith identity in order to appear professional. 
Evidence of postsecular cross-over narratives appear in the shape of faith and secular actors 
working towards a shared ethical agenda (i.e. neo-abolitionism), but many FBOs seem to be 
secularising aspects of their work and adopting a ‘secular register’ in order to participate in this 
terrain. Beneath plentiful evidence of ostensible postsecular partnerships, many FBOs actually 
prioritise secular modalities (Tomalin, 2018) meaning the learning process is one sided rather 
than complementary. Engagement in welfare provision requires what Hjelm (2015: 10) calls 
‘external interpellation’, requiring religious communities to limit religiosity to allow them to 
partner with the state. So far, our findings demonstrate the need for a more nuanced conceptual 
framework than one that suggests that the rapprochement between faith and secular actors in 
the anti-TFLS field is convincingly postsecular. We argue that it is not, as it does not equally 
value and recognise faith and secular identities.  Going forward, it is critical that sociological 
research around the postsecular explores the nuances of how, and on what terms, particular 
faith actors are entering specific public arenas.  The nature and extent of a postsecular 
rapprochement between faith and secular actors may depend on the specific terrain of 
engagement and activities undertaken. 
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nature. Conversely, some calculations inflate figures based on data that conflates varied and broad exploitation 
phenomena. 
v ES/N014979/1 





x https://archive.org/web/  
 
References 
Asad T. (1993) Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and 
Islam, Baltimore; London: The John Hopkins University Press. 
Beaumont J. (2008) Faith action on urban social issues. Urban Studies 45: 2019-2034. 
Beaumont J and Cloke P. (2012) Faith-based organisations and exclusion in European cities, 
Bristol; Chicago: The Policy Press. 
Beckford JA. (2012) SSSR presidential address public religions and the postsecular: Critical 
reflections. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 51: 1-19. 
Bielefeld W and Cleveland WS. (2013) Defining faith-based organizations and understanding 
them through research. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 42: 442-467. 
Bradstock F, Chalke E, Crossley E, et al. (2014) Becoming Hope: Stories, Reflections and 
Recommendations about Trafficking and Slavery Aftercare in the UK. London: The 
Sophie Hayes Foundation. 
Butler P and Travis A. (2011) Sex trafficking charity loses out to Salvation Army over £6m 
contract. The Guardian Online. 
Cairns B, Harris M and Hutchison R. (2007) Sharing God's love or meeting government goals? 
Local churches and public policy implementation. Policy and Politics 35: 413. 
Campbell LM and Zimmerman YC. (2014) Christian ethics and human trafficking activism: 
Progressive Christianity and social critique. Journal of the Society of Christian Ethics 
34: 145-172. 
Casanova J. (1994) Public Religions in the Modern World, Chicago; London: Chicago 
University Press. 
Christian Action in Research and Education (CARE). (2017) Human Trafficking: Supporter 
briefing. London: Christian Action in Research and Education (CARE). 
Chuang JA. (2014) Exploitation creep and the unmaking of human trafficking law. American 
Journal of International Law 108: 609-649. 
Church of Scotland. (2007) Human Trafficking: to be silent is to be unfaithful. Edinburgh: 





Cloke P. (2011) Emerging geographies of evil? Theo-ethics and postsecular possibilities. 
cultural geographies 18: 475-493. 
Cloke P and Beaumont J. (2013) Geographies of postsecular rapprochement in the city. 
Progress in Human Geography 37: 27-51. 
Cloke P, May J and Johnsen S. (2010) Swept up lives?: Re-envisioning the homeless city, 
Malden, MA; Oxford: John Wiley & Sons. 
Cloke P, May J and Williams A. (2017) The geographies of food banks in the meantime. 
Progress in Human Geography 41: 703-726. 
Cloke P, Thomas S and Williams A. (2012) Radical faith praxis? Exploring the changing 
theological landscape of Christian faith motivation. In: Beaumont J and Cloke P (eds) 
Faith-based organisations and exclusion in European cities. Bristol; Chicago: The 
Policy Press, 105-126. 
Cooley B. (2015) Hope for Justice. In: Kinsella N and Stanley P (eds) Fighting Slavery - Faith 
in Action. Maidstone, Kent: River Publishing & Media Ltd, 65-73. 
Davie G. (2015) Religion in Britain: A Persistent Paradox, Malden, MA; Oxford: Blackwells. 
Dillon M. (2012) Jürgen Habermas and the Post-Secular Appropriation of Religion. In: Gorski 
P, Kim D, Torpey J, et al. (eds) Probing the Post-Secular. New York: New York 
University Press/Social Science Research Council. 
Dinham A. (2009) Faiths, public policy and civil society: Problems, policies, controversies, 
Basingstoke and New York:: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Durkheim E. (1915) The Elementary Forms of Religious Life: A Study in Religious Sociology, 
New York: Macmillan. 
Eder K. (2002) Europäische Säkularisierung—ein Sonderweg in die postsäkulare Gesellschaft? 
Berliner Journal für Soziologie 12: 331-343. 
Eder K. (2006) Post-secularism: A return to the public sphere. Eurozine 8: 17-20. 
Evans B, Richmond T and Shields J. (2005) Structuring neoliberal governance: The nonprofit 
sector, emerging new modes of control and the marketisation of service delivery. Policy 
and Society 24: 73-97. 
Filby E. (2011) Faith, charity and citizenship: Christianity, voluntarism and the state in the 
1980s. In: Hilton M and McKay J (eds) Ages of Voluntarism: How We Got to the Big 
Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press / British Academy, 135-157. 
Frame J. (2017) Exploring the approaches to care of faith-based and secular NGOs in 
Cambodia that serve victims of trafficking, exploitation, and those involved in sex 
work. International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy 37: 311-326. 
Fyfe NR. (2005) Making space for “neo‐communitarianism”? The third sector, state and civil 
society in the UK. Antipode 37: 536-557. 
Global Freedom Network. (2016) A United Faith Against Modern Slavery: The Joint 
Declaration of Religious Leaders Against Modern Slavery. The Minderoo Foundation. 
Habermas J. (2006) Religion in the public sphere. European journal of philosophy 14: 1-25. 
Habermas J. (2008) Notes on a post-secular society. signandsight.com. (accessed 1 March 
2019). 
Habermas J. (2010) An awareness of what is missing. In: Habermas J, Brieskorn N, Reder M, 
et al. (eds) An Awareness of What Is Missing: Faith and Reason in a Postsecular Age. 
Cambridge: Polity Press, 15-23. 
Harris M, Halfpenny P and Rochester C. (2003) A Social Policy Role for Faith-Based 
Organisations? Lessons from the UK Jewish Voluntary Sector. Journal of Social Policy 
32: 93-112. 
Hill A. (2011) Poppy Project funding redirected to Salvation Army. The Guardian Online. 






Hodgson N and Robinson C. (2011) The value of the Poppy Project. The Guardian Online. 
Jawad R. (2012) Religion and faith-based welfare: From wellbeing to ways of being, Bristol; 
Chicago: Policy Press. 
Johnsen S. (2014) Where's the ‘faith’in ‘faith-based’organisations? The evolution and practice 
of faith-based homelessness services in the UK. Journal of Social Policy 43: 413-430. 
Kellaway K. (2018) Grenfell one year on: the mosque manager who took in survivors. The 
Observer Online. 
Kinsella N and Stanley P. (2015) Fighting Slavery - Faith in Action. Maidstone, Kent: River 
Publishing & Media Ltd. 
Lancione M. (2014) Entanglements of faith: Discourses, practices of care and homeless people 
in an Italian City of Saints. Urban Studies 51: 3062-3078. 
Limoncelli SA. (2017) The global development of contemporary anti-human trafficking 
advocacy. International Sociology 32: 814-834. 
McGrath S and Watson S. (2018) Anti-slavery as development: A global politics of rescue. 
Geoforum 93: 22-31. 
McLennan G. (2007) Towards postsecular sociology? Sociology 41: 857-870. 
Milivojevic S and Pickering S. (2013) Trafficking in People, 20 Years On: Sex, Migration and 
Crime in the Global Anti-Trafficking Discourse and the Rise of the Global Trafficking 
Complex. Current Issues Crim. Just. 25: 585. 
National Crime Agency. (n. d.) National Referral Mechanism. Available at: 
http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/about-us/what-we-do/specialist-
capabilities/uk-human-trafficking-centre/national-referral-mechanism. 
Patel P. (2011) Women migrants and faith organisations: changing regimes of gender, religion 
and race in London. feminist review 97: 142-150. 
Patterson O and Zhuo X. (2018) Modern Trafficking, Slavery, and Other Forms of Servitude. 
Annual Review of Sociology. 
Peck J and Tickell A. (2002) Neoliberalizing Space. Antipode 34: 388-392. 
Pemberton C. (2006) For God's sake not for sale: trafficking and the church in Europe. Gender 
& Development 14: 399-408. 
Pemberton Ford C. (2017) Behind closed doors - voices against gender-based violence, human 
trafficking and modern-day slavery. Cambridge. 
Prochaska F. (2006) Christianity and Social Service in Modern Britain: The Disinherited 
Spirit, Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press. 
Raimi L. (2012) Faith-based advocacy as a tool for mitigating human trafficking in Nigeria. 
Humanomics 28: 297-310. 
Religious in Europe Networking Against Trafficking and Exploitation (RENATE). (2015) A 
Mapping Across Europe. Den Bosch, The Netherlands. 
Roth S. (2019) Humanitarian NGOs. In: Davies T (ed) Routledge Handbook of NGOs and 
International Relations. Abingdon; New York: Routledge, 267-282. 
Sider RJ and Unruh HR. (2004) Typology of religious characteristics of social service and 
educational organizations and programs. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 33: 
109-134. 
Singh J. (2015) From the temple to the street: how Sikh kitchens are becoming the new food 
banks. The Conversation. 
Stanley P. (2015) A Change of Perspective. In: Kinsella N and Stanley P (eds) Fighting Slavery 
- Faith in Action. Maidstone, Kent: River Publishing & Media Ltd, 75-90. 
The Anti Trafficking Monitoring Group (ATMG). (2010) Wrong kind of victim? One year on: 
an analysis of UK measures to protect trafficked persons. London. 






Tomalin E. (2015) The Routledge handbook of religions and global development. Abingdon; 
New York: Routledge. 
Tomalin E. (2018) Religions, poverty reduction and global development institutions. Palgrave 
Communications 4: 132. 
Weber M. (1930) The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, London: Allen and Unwin. 
Weitzer R. (2007) The social construction of sex trafficking: Ideology and institutionalization 
of a moral crusade. Politics & Society 35: 447-475. 
Williams A. (2015) Postsecular geographies: theo‐ethics, rapprochement and neoliberal 
governance in a faith‐based drug programme. Transactions of the Institute of British 
Geographers 40: 192-208. 
Williams A, Cloke P and Thomas S. (2012) Co-constituting neoliberalism: faith-based 
organisations, co-option, and resistance in the UK. Environment and Planning A 44: 
1479-1501. 
Wills J, Datta K, Evans Y, et al. (2009) Religion at work: The role of faith-based organizations 
in the London living wage campaign. Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and 
Society 2: 443-461. 
Womensgrid. (2011) Anti-Trafficking Legal Project and MP also question failure to fund 
Poppy Project. Womensgrid Archive. 
Zimmerman YC. (2010) From Bush to Obama: Rethinking Sex and Religion in the United 
States' Initiative to Combat Human Trafficking. Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion 
26: 79-99. 
Zimmerman YC. (2011) Christianity and human trafficking. Religion Compass 5: 567-578. 
Zimmerman YC. (2013) Other dreams of freedom: Religion, sex, and human trafficking, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Author Biographies 
Gwyneth Lonergan is a Wellcome Trust Research Fellow in Social Science and Bioethics in 
the department of Sociology at Lancaster University 
Hannah Lewis is Senior Research Fellow in the department of Sociological Studies at the 
University of Sheffield. 
Emma Tomalin is Professor of Religion and Public Life at the University of Leeds 
Louise Waite is Professor of Human Geography at the University of Leeds 
